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Liability of Parents for the Willful Torts of Their Children
Under Ohio Revised Code Section 3109.09
Stuart A. Laven*
T EN YEARS AGO THE OHIO LEGISLATURE ENACTED A STATUTE which
imposed liability on the parents of children who willfully dam-
aged the property of another.' Codified under Section 3109.09 of the
Ohio Revised Code, the statute allowed "any owner of property" to
recover in a civil action an amount not to exceed $250 from the
*B.A. University of Pennsylvania; J.D. Case Western Reserve University School of Law;
Member, Ohio Bar.
1 At common law a parent was not liable for torts committed by his child by reason of the
relationship of the parent and child. White v. Page, 61 Ohio L. Abs. 698, 105 N.E.2d 652
(Ohio App. 1950); 41 OHIO JUR. 2d Parent and Child § 54 (1960). However, liability
could be imposed upon the parents for the child's wrongful acts if it could be shown that the
parents participated in, consented to or ratified the act; that they negligently permitted
the child to conduct himself in a manner likely to cause injury; or that the child was an
employee or agent of the parents and the wrongful act was committed during the course of
his employment or agency. See Annot., 155 A.L.R. 85 (1945). Most civil law codes, by
contrast, impose some degree of liability on parents for torts committed by their children.
Comment, Parent and Child-Civil Responsibility of Parents for the Torts of Children-
Statutory Imposition of Strict Liability, 3 VILL. L. REV. 529, 531-32 (1958).
For a good textual discussion of common law theories of liability and exceptions
thereto, see HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8.13, at 657 (1956); PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 123, at 871 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 316 (1965). See also Chastain v. Johns, 120 Ga. 977, 48 S.E. 343 (1904); White v.
Seitz, 342 Ill. 266, 174 N.E. 371 (1931); Zeeb v. Bahmaier, 103 Kan. 599, 176 P. 326
(1918); Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 App. Div. 518, 293 N.Y.S. 147 (1937); Lane v.
Chatham, 251 N.C. 400, 111 S.E. 2d 598 (1959).
The problems surrounding the common law immunity rule and its exceptions, and the
legislative attempts to abrogate the rule, have been the subject of several commentaries.
Freer, Parental Libality (sic) for Torts of Children, 53 Ky. L.J. 254 (1964); Greenwood,
Liability of a Parent for the Torts of his Minor Child, 18 CENT. L.J. 3 (1884); Jordan,
Liability of a Parent for Child's Tort, 11 VA. L. REG. (n.s.) 734 (1926); Waller, Visiting
the Sins of the Children, 4 MELBOURNE L. REV. 17 (1963); Wigmore, Parent's Liability
for Child's Torts, 19 ILL. L. REV. 202 (1924); Comment, 13 ARIz. L. REv. 720 (1971);
25 ARK. L. REV. 368 (1971); Comment, 8 IDAHO L. REV. 179 (1971); 19 LOYOLA L.
REV. 758 (1973); Note, 6 U.C.D. L. REV. 195 (1973); 7 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 571
(1973).
In the early 1950's, state legislatures began to penetrate the parents' common law
immunity from intentional torts committed by their children by enacting statutes which
imposed, to varying degrees, liability on the parents regardless of any fault on their part.
Today more than 45 states have such statutes. For a recent summary and analysis of these
statutes, see Note, The Iowa Parental Responsibility Act, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1037 (1970).
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parents of such a child.2 While Section 3109.09 was not the Legis-
lature's first pronouncement on the subject of parental liability,3 it
was Ohio's first law which provided a private civil remedy for the
injured party.
On its face Section 3109.09 seems uncomplicated. 4 Although it
has been amended twice to increase the limit of liability,5 the basic
2 Unfortunately, there is no legislative history available which might reveal the legislature's
purpose in enacting Section 3109.09 of the Ohio Revised Code [hereinafter, Ohio Revised
Code Sections will be referred to as "Section," e.g., Section 3109.09]. The purposes ex-
pressed in enacting similar parental liability statutes in other states have been to curb
juvenile delinquency by making parents more responsible with respect to the behavior of
their children; to compensate the injured property owner; or to both curb delinquency and
provide a means of compensation. While there can be no doubt that parental liability
statutes have provided injured property owners with some compensation in circumstances
in which no effective means of recovery would have otherwise been available, one study
indicates such statutes have had little, if any, effect on reducing juvenile delinquency. See
Freer, supra note 1.
3 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.411 (Page 1968), which became effective on September
13, 1957, provides:
Liability of parents for acts of delinquent child.
A parent or guardian having custody of a child is charged with the control of
such child and shall have the power to exercise parental control and authority
over such child. In any case where a child is found delinquent and placed on
probation, if the court finds at the hearing that the parent having .custody of such
child has failed or neglected to subject him to reasonable parental control and
authority, and that such failure or neglect is the proximate cause of the act or
acts of the child upon which the finding of delinquency is based, the court may
require such parent to enter into a recognizance with sufficient surety, in an
amount of not more than five hundred dollars, conditioned upon the faithful dis-
charge of the conditions of probation of such child. If the child thereafter com-
mits a second act and is by reason thereof found delinquent, or violates the condi-
tions of probation, and the court finds at the hearing that the failure or neglect
of such parent to subject him to reasonable parental control and authority or to
faithfully discharge the conditions of probation of such child on the part of such
parent, is the proximate cause of the act or acts of the child upon which such sec-
ond finding of delinquency is based, or upon which such child is found to have
violated the conditions of his probation, the court may declare all or a part of
the recognizance forfeited and the amount of such forfeited recognizance shall
be applied in payment of any damages which may have been caused by such child,
if there be such damages, otherwise, the proceeds therefrom, or part remaining
after the payment of damages as aforesaid, shall be paid into the county treasury.
The provisions of this section as it relates to failure or neglect of parents to
subject a child to reasonable parental control and authority shall be in addition
to and not in substitution for any other sections of this chapter relating to the
failure or neglect to exercise such parental control or authority. The provisions
of this section shall not apply to foster parents.
See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.07 (Page 1973) which imputes the negligence or
willful misconduct of a minor while driving a motor vehicle to the person, usually the par-
ent, who signed his driver's license application.
4OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.09 (Page 1972), as amended, provides:
Liability of parents for destructive acts by their children.
Any owner of property is entitled to maintain an action to recover compensatory
damages in a civil action in an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars and
costs of suit in a court of competent jurisdiction from the parents having the
custody and control of a minor under the age of eighteen years, who willfully
damages property belonging to such owner. A finding of willful destruction of
property is not dependent upon a prior finding of delinquency of such minor.
Such action shall be commenced and heard as in other civil actions for damages.
Baldwin's Ohio Revised Code has entitled this section "Liability of parents for vandalism
by their chilren."
5 Section 3109.09 as originally enacted limited the parents' liability to $250. Am. Sub. H.B.
No. 134, 131 Laws of Ohio 689 (1965). The statute was amended in 1967 to increase the
(Continued on next page)
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provisions have remained unchanged. Furthermore, this section has
been the subject of only one reported Ohio decision, and this decision
did not deal with an interpretation of the statute's language.' Never-
theless, its application to various fact situations is unclear and
raises several issues of interpretation. This article will examine four7
such issues which the practitioner may face in handling litigation
under Section 3109.09 :s whether the statute extends to a "taking"
of property; whether the term "parents" includes others who have
custody and control of a minor; whether an insurance company as a
subrogated plaintiff may maintain an action under the statute; and,
finally, whether parents of the minor wrongdoer are provided with
coverage under their homeowners policy in an action brought against
them under Section 3109.09.
(Continued from preceding page)
limit of liability to $800 and in 1969 to increase the limit to $2,000. Am. H.B. No. 257,
132 Laws of Ohio 973 (1967); Am. S.B. No. 10, 133 Laws of Ohio 17 (1969). The 1969
Amendment also substituted the word "compensatory" for the word "actual" in the first
sentence of the statute describing the nature of the damages which could be recovered.
6 Lewis v. Martin, 16 Ohio Misc. 18 (C.P. 1968) (Held: the 1967 amendment to Section
3109.09 increasing the limit of liability was not retroactive; and where two or more chil-
dren, all covered by the provisions of Section 3109.09, combine to do damage, the parents
are responsible for the amount set forth in the statute for each of such children.)
7 Although the constitutionality of Section 3109.09 is not discussed in this article, it is prob-
ably the first question which an attorney defending a claim under the statute should con-
sider. At the present time there are no reported Ohio decisions dealing with the constitu-
tionality of Section 3109.09; nevertheless, the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in
Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971), and the numerous articles by
commentators dealing generally with the constitutionality of statutes which impose vicarious
liability on parents for acts of their children indicate that the constitutionality of Section
3109.09 should not be taken for granted. See, e.g., Note, Torts - The Constitutional
Validity of Parental Liability Statutes, 55 MARQ. L. REv. 584 (1972); Note, Constitutional
Law-Due Process -Parental Tort Liability Solely on Basis of Parent-Child Relation
Held Unconstitutional, 23 MERCER L. REV. 681 (1972); Note, A Constitutional Caveat
on the Vicarious Liability of Parents, 47 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 1321 (1972).
In Corley the plaintiff alleged that he had been injured by a rock thrown by a minor
under the custody and control of his mother and uncle, and brought suit against the mother
and uncle under GA. CODE ANN. § 105-113 (1968) which imposed liability on the
minor's parents or persons standing in loco parentis. The Georgia statute had no monetary
limit, and in holding the statute unconstitutional on the grounds it would deprive a de-
fendant of property without due process of law, the court distinguished similar statutes
which were limited to "property damage" and "contained a limitation of $300 or $500 on
the amount recoverable" because "[s]uch recoveries are in the nature of penalties, because
they do not have as their objective compensation of the injured parties." Id. at 749, 182
S.E.2d at 769. While Ohio's Section 3109.09 sets a $2,000 limit on the parents' liability,
it does not necessarily follow that Ohio's statute is "penal" and thus distinguishable from
the Corley doctrine that faultless liability is unconstitutional.
On the other hand, three courts have upheld the constitutionality of parental liability
statutes. See General Ins. Co. of America v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963);
Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. App. 1961); Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises,
Inc., 426 P.2d 442 (Wyo. 1967). See also Gilbert v. Floyd, 119 Ga. App. 670, 168 S.E.2d
607 (1969), which held GA. CODE ANN. § 105-113 constitutional prior to its amend-
ment and prior to it being held unconstitutional in Corley.
s In 1969 a similar statute was enacted which imposes vicarious liability upon parents of a
minor who willfully assaults a person by a means likely to produce great bodily harm.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.10 (Page 1972). This statute, like Section 3109.09, per-
mits the injured party to maintain a civil action to recover compensatory damages from
the parents of the minor wrongdoer in an amount not to exceed $2,000. While an analysis
of Section 3109.10 has not been undertaken in this article, many of the questions relating
to the construction and application of Section 3109.09 are nevertheless applicable to Sec-
tion 3109.10.
1975]
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Application to a "Taking" of Property
Section 3109.09 provides a civil remedy against the parents of
a minor who "willfully damages property." Certainly the language
would include the acts of a minor who literally destroys or damages
property; e.g., a minor who maliciously destroys a person's dwelling
or its contents.9 However, it is not clear whether the statute includes
the acts of a minor who "steals" the property of another.
The resolution of this issue has considerable practical signifi-
cance. It is not uncommon for a minor to steal personal property
that is never recovered, although the minor's guilt is subsequently
established. Since the minor is usually uncollectible, the owner's only
remedy may be an action against the minor's parents under Section
3109.09; that is, if the statute applies to a "taking of property." 10
From the standpoint of the injured property owner, it makes
little difference whether his property was merely stolen or physically
destroyed. Both circumstances involve willful acts and result in an
identical injury. It would seem unjust and illogical to permit the
owner to recover from the minor's parents only when the property
is physically destroyed, and thus a proper interpretation would sug-
gest that the word "damage" be given its broadest meaning."
9Lewis v. Martin, 16 Ohio Misc. 18 (C.P. 1968). It is interesting to note that Section
3109.09 requires that the minor willfully, as opposed to intentionally, damage property of
another. The term "willfully" implies the necessity of showing a "purpose or design to
injure." Reserve Trucking Co. v. Fairchild, 128 Ohio St. 519, 191 N.E. 745 (1934).
Simply establishing that the minor intended to complete the physical act of destroying
property, without showing a purpose or design to injure would not appear to be sufficient
to impose liability on the minor's parents under Section 3109.09. This conclusion has
added significance when the minor wrongdoer is "of tender years." In Ohio a child under
the age of seven years is conclusively presumed to be incapable of being contributorily neg-
ligent because of his incapacity and lack of experience to appreciate the dangers which
confront him. Holbrock v. Hamilton Distributing, Inc., 11 Ohio St. 2d 185, 228 N.E.2d
628 (1967); 28 OHIO JUR. 2d Infants § 39 (1958). While there are no reported Ohio
decisions directly reaching such a result, it could be argued that a child under seven years
of age should likewise conclusively be presumed incapable of acting "willfully." See gen-
erally Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 570, 575 (1959). But see Shiflet v. Segovia, 40 Ohio App. 2d
244 ,...... N E.2d ---- (1974). On the other hand, a child's age offers no immunity when
the determinative question is whether the child intended to complete the physical act
which caused the damage. See Allstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Singler, 9 Ohio App. 2d 103, 23
N.E.2d 65 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 14 Ohio St. 2d 27, 236 N.E.2d 79 (1968).
10 Some parental liability statutes are more explicit. For example, Pennsylvania's statute im-
poses liability on the parents for a "tortious act resulting in injury to the person, or theft,
destruction or loss of property of another ..." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2002 (Supp. 1974).
17 The verb "damage" means "to do or cause damage." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 571 (1961). The noun "damage" has been defined by Ohio courts
as the "loss, injury or deterioration caused by the negligence, design, or accident of one
person, to another, in respect to the latter's person or property...." 16 OHIO JUR. 2d Dam-
ages § 2 (1971). By stealing an individual's property one has caused a loss of the prop-
erty and, by definition, has damaged the property.
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss1/4
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This construction of Section 3109.09 is also supported by the
argument that the statute is essentially remedial in nature12 and
should therefore be liberally construed in order to promote its object
of compensating the injured property owner. 3 Section 3109.09 does
not impose liability for a fixed sum without reference to the damage
inflicted by the wrongdoer ;14 rather, it offers compensation commen-
surate with the actual loss suffered by the property owner.
However, the statute is also subject to a second, and much nar-
rower, interpretation. It is a general rule of statutory construction
that a statute in derogation of the common law must be strictly con-
strued, and at common law an injured property owner was not per-
mitted to recover from the parents of the minor wrongdoer unless
the parents had directed or participated in the act.15 Since the
vicarious liability imposed by Section 3109.09 is in derogation of the
common law, it can be argued that the statute must be strictly con-
strued and cannot be extended to include acts which are not actually
specified. 6
12Section 3109.09 would appear to be remedial rather than "penal" because the injured
party's recovery is limited to the actual damages which he suffered. On the other hand,
Section 2151.411 would be classified as "penal" because the parents may be "fined" with-
out regard to the actual damages caused by their child. Full text quoted in note 3 supra.
See Belmont Co. v. Brown, 5 Ohio App. 394, 403 (1916); 50 OHIO JUR. 2d Statutes § 15
(1961). But see Corley v. Lewless, 27 Ga. 745, 748, 182 S.E.2d 766, 769 (1971) (par-
ental liability statutes which limit the amount of recovery are "in the nature of penalties
because they do not have as their objecive compensation of injured parties").
13 The Ohio Legislature has provided that remedial statutes must be construed liberally, and
has abrogated the common law rule that statutes in derogation of the common law must
be strictly construed. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.11 (Page 1969) provides:
Remedial laws and all proceedings under them shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining justice. The rule
of the common law that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly
construed has no application to remedial laws; but this section does not require a
liberal construction of laws affecting personal liberty, relating to amercement, or
of a penal nature.
14 Compare Section 3109.09 with Section 2151.411 which essentially enables a court to "fine"
the parents of a minor wrongdoer in an amount not to exceed $500 without regard to the
actual damage caused by the child.
15 It was also possible to recover from the parents at common law if one could establish that
the parents had negligently permitted the child to conduct himself in a manner likely to
cause injury or that the child was an employee or agent of the parents and the wrongful
act was committed during the course of his employment or agency. See discussion in note
1 supra.
16 Illustrative of this argument is the case of Bell v. Adams, 111 Ga. App. 819, 143 S.E.2d
413 (1965). In Bell, the plaintiff sued the father of a minor who had intentionally shot
and killed the plaintiff's son under a statute which made the minor's parents liable for the
minor's "willful and wanton acts of vandalism . . . resulting in injury or damage to the
person or property of another." In upholding the trial court's judgment sustaining the de-
fendant's demurrer, the Georgia Court of Appeals noted:
[The statute] is in derogation of common law. For this reason it must be strictly
construed .... "Vandalism" does not encompass within its meaning acts directed
only against persons. Accordingly, the statute provides for liability of the parent
only in instances where the child's act is one that is intended to damage prop-
erty. Of course, an act of vandalism within this meaning of the code may result
in injury to persons and consequent liability of the parent for personal injuries
inflicted.
(Continued on next page)
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The "strict construction" approach seemed to be adopted by the
Garfield Heights Municipal Court in Centennial Insurance Co. v.
Dukes." In Centennial, the plaintiff insurance company brought
suit under Section 3109.09 against the respective parents of three
minors to recover damages incurred by its insured when the minors
stole various articles of clothing from the insured's place of business.
Most of the items stolen were sold or destroyed before the minors
were arrested and, consequently, were never recovered. The court
granted one defendant parent's motion to dismiss, noting simply that
Section 3109.09 "does not apply to a taking of property."
Notwithstanding the decision in Centennial, however, the pos-
sibility of recovering under Section 3109.09 for a "taking" of prop-
erty has not been entirely foreclosed. In view of the legislative ob-
jectives and policies behind the statute, a litigant can make some
substantial arguments for including a theft within the purview of
Section 3109.09.18
Interpretation of "Parents"
A second issue as to how terms found in Section 3109.09 are to
be defined deals with the question of who are "parents" under the
statute. Section 3109.09 imposes liability upon "the parents having the
custody and control of a minor under the age of eighteen years."
(Emphasis added). While there is no doubt that the statute applies to
the natural parents19 if they have the custody 0 and control21 of their
child, there is some uncertainty as to whether it also applies to per-
(Continued from preceding page)
Id at 820, 143 S.E.2d at 415.
One does not have to resolve, however, whether given the facts of Bell an Ohioan could
recover under Section 3109.09. In 1969 the Ohio Legislature specifically provided for such
situations in a companion statute. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.10 (Page 1972)
and discussion in note 8 supra.
17No. 11520 (Garfield Hts. Mun. Ct., March 3, 1972).
18 See notes 11-14 supra and accompanying text.
19 Most likely it would also include adoptive parents since
a legally adopted child shall have the same status and rights, and shall bear the
same legal relationship to the adopting parents as if born to them in lawful wed-
lock and not born to natural parents....
OHIO REV. CODE ANN, § 3107.13 (Page 1972).
Moreover, the
[a)dopting parents are entitled to custody of their adopted child to the exclu-
sion of all other persons until some lawful reason for a change of the child's
custody is made to appear by competent evidence.
Martin v. Fisher, 25 Ohio App. 372, 376, 158 N.E. 287, 288 (1927).
20 The natural parents have the predominant right to custody of their child, but such right
may be relinquished by agreement, or forfeited if the parents abandon or neglect the child
or allow the child to become dependent, unruly or deliquent. See generally 31 OHIO JUR.
2d Parent and Child §§ 15, 21 and 22 (1960). In addition, one may be deemed to have
custody of a child by virtue of his relationship to the child even though he may not have
technical "legal" custody or the primary right to custody. For example, in determining who
(Continued on next page)
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sons standing in loco parentis2 2 to and having custody23 and control
of a minor, such as stepparents, 4 foster parents,25 guardians26 or,
possibly, institutions or agencies to which the custody of a child has
been transferred by agreement 7 or court order.28
(Continued from preceding page)
constitutes a "person having custody of the applicant" for the purpose of signing the
application for a probationary driver's license under Section 4507.07, the Ohio Attorney
General has ruled:
Although Section 4507.07 implies that a parent who signs an application for a
minor should have custody, a divorced parent does not cease to be a parent for
the purposes of this Section merely because legal custody has been awarded to
the other spouse. The divorced parent who has visitation rights retains some ele-
ments of custody.
Ohio Att'y Gen. Op., Opinion No. 72-087 at 2-353 (1972) (citations omitted).
21 Section 2151.411 provides that "[a] parent or guardian having custody of a child is
charged with the control of such child .... " (Emphasis added). If the effect of Section
2151.411 is to create a conclusive presumption that the parents having custody of their
child have control of such child, the language of Section 3109.09 requiring that the par-
ents have not only custody but also "control" would appear to be redundant. But under
Section 2151.022 the Legislature has recognized that the parents may not be able to
control their child by reason of his being wayward or habitually disobedient. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.022 (Page Supp. 1973). Could parents possibly avoid liability under
Section 3109.09 by arguing that while they had custody of their child they never really
had "control" of him?
" The term "loco parentis" has been defined to describe "the situation of one who has as-
sumed the obligations of the parental relationship without going through the formalities
of legal adoption." Ohio Att'y Gen. Op., Opinion No. 7008 at 644, 646 (1956). "[Ilt
is the policy of law to encourage and extend the relationship of parent and child, and
where the relation is assumed, all the rights and liabilities thereof attach." 41 OHIO JUR.
2d Parent and Child § 35 (1960).
23One standing in loco parentis to a child is entitled to his custody. See, e.g., Wing v. Hib-
bert, 7 Ohio N.P. 124 (C.P. 1897), rev'd on other grounds, 11 Ohio C.D. 190 (1899).
U As a general rule a stepparent, by virtue of that relationship alone, does not stand in loco
parentis to a stepchild. However,
[i)f a stepchild is received into the home, the relationship of parent and child
does arise. A stepfather, under such circumstances, who educates and supports the
stepchild and discharges to him all the duties of a parent, stands in loco parentis
to him ....
41 OHIO JUR. 2d Parent and Child §6 at 309 (1960).
For the purposes of this discussion it is assumed that the stepparent stands in loco parentis
to the stepchild.
25 A "foster parent" is "one who has performed the duties of a parent to the child of another
by rearing the child as his own child." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
A foster parent stands in loco parentis to the foster child. See Ohio Att'y Gen. Op., Opinion
No. 6541 at 554, 569 (1943).
2 While under Section 2111.08 the natural parents are deemed the guardians of their minor
child, Section 2111.06 requires the probate court to appoint a guardian for
[a] minor having neither father nor mother, or whose parents are unsuitable
persons to have the custody ... of such minor, or whose interests, in the opinion
of the court, will be promoted thereby ....
Section 2111.06 further provides that such guardian shall have the custody of the minor.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2111.06, .08 (Page 1968). By virtue of Section 2111.13 a
guardian of the person has the duty to "control" his ward. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2111.13 (Page 1968). Since the guardian exercises many other duties similar to those
of a parent, he stands in loco parentis to his ward. See Davis v. Ford, 7 Ohio 390, 395
(1836).
2OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.15 (Page 1970), which provides, in pertinent part:
Placing of a child in public or private institution.
The parents, guardian, or other persons having custody of a child, may enter into
(Continued on next page)
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It is difficult to predict how the courts will resolve this issue.
One unreported Ohio decision indicates that the term "parents" as
used in Section 3109.09 must be construed narrowly to include only
"natural" parents. In St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.
v. Boyd29 a default judgment was obtained under Section 3109.09
against the natural mother and stepfather of a minor who had al-
legedly willfully damaged the property of plaintiff's insured. Sub-
sequently the stepfather filed a motion to vacate the judgment as it
applied to him on the ground that Section 3109.09 did not apply to
a stepparent. 0 The court, without any oral or written opinion, simply
granted the stepfather's motion and vacated the judgment.
Yet, two arguments support an interpretation of the term "par-
ents" in Section 3109.09 which imposes liability not only on the
natural parents but also on persons standing in loco parentis to the
minor wrongdoer. First, assuming that the Legislature intended to
protect society from the willful and malicious acts of minors, and
that the statute should be liberally construed to effect its intended
purpose, 31 it follows that liability should be imposed upon those
actually having custody and the legal right to exercise control over
the minor regardless of whether they are the natural or loco parentis
"parents." 32
(Continued from preceding page)
an agreement with any association or institution of this state established for the
purposes of aiding, caring for, or placing children in homes, which has been ap-
proved and certified by the division of social administration, whereby such child
is placed in the temporary custody of such institution or association; or such
parent, guardian, or other person may make an agreement surrendering such
child into the permanent custody of such association or institution, to be taken
and cared for by such association or institution, or placed in a family home.
28 Under Sections 2151.353 to 2151.355, a juvenile court may commit a neglected, dependent,
unruly or delinquent child to the temporary or permanent custody of, inter alia, a county
department of welfare which has assumed the administration of child welfare, county chil-
dren services boards or to any other certified agency, whether public or private. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§2151.353-2151.355 (Page Supp. 1973). Section 2151.353(D) provides
that upon any such permanent commitment "[tjhe natural or adoptive parents are divested
of all legal rights and obligations due from them to the child or from the child to them."
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(D) (Page Supp. 1973).
2No. A 930 021 (Cleveland Municipal Court, January 19, 1972).
30 The defendant argued, inter alia, that:
The natural parent usually teaches the child a sense of right and wrong. The child
identifies with the parent at an early age. By the time a stepparent, such as De-
fendant steps in, the child's nature has been determined. Clearly the stepparent
has no control over the child at this stage, outside of brute force. Liability for
the child's acts, under these circumstances, would be unfair, and would impose
a choice upon the stepparent of paying the penalty or imprisoning the child.
Brief for Defendant at 3-4, St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Boyd, No. A 930 021
(Cleveland Municipal Court, January 19, 1972).
31 See discussion notes 12 and 13 supra.
32 Of course, even if the loco parentis construction is accepted, in order to impose liability
under Section 3109.09 on a state institution or agency having custody and control of a
child one would have to overcome the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Krause v. Ohio,
31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972),
petition for reheariing dismissed, 410 U.S. 918 (1973). But see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 414
U.S ........ 94 S.Cr. 1683 (1974).
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Second, a close examination of Section 2151.41111 supports a
broad interpretation of the word "parents." Under certain circum-
stances Section 2151.411, somewhat of a predecessor to Section
3109.09, permits a court to require the parent having custody of a
delinquent child to enter into a recognizance to assure the child's
good behavior. Like Section 3109.09, Section 2151.411 does not define
"parent"; however, the latter statute does provide that "[t]he pro-
visions of this section shall not apply to foster parents." Thus, by
excluding one type of non-natural parent standing in loco parentis
to the child, it follows, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that the
Legislature intended the word "parent" to include both natural par-
ents and other persons in loco parentis unless specifically excluded.
Since Section 3109.09 deals with the same subject matter as, and
was enacted after, Section 2151.411, this construction of the word
"parent" should apply equally as well to this more recent statute.
The St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. decision gave the
term "parents" a narrow interpretation. When the facts reveal
that the non-natural parent actually had the custody and control of
the minor wrongdoer at the time the damage occurred, the policy
and statutory construction arguments in favor of imposing liability
under Section 3109.09 upon such a "parent" should not be overlooked.M
Subrogation Under Section 3109.09
Still another problem of statutory interpretation relates to the
phrase "owner of property." Although Section 3109.09 permits an
"owner of property" to recover from the parents of the minor wrong-
doer, as a practical matter it is usually the owner's insurance com-
pany, having paid the owner for his loss and become "subrogated"
to his rights, which actually seeks recovery. While Section 3109.09
3OHiO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.411 (Page 1968). See note 3 supra.
34 In this connection it is interesting to note that the meaning of the word "parent" under
Georgia's parental liability statute has also been challenged in a slightly different context.
The Georgia parental liability statute as originally enacted (Acts 1965, p. 699 repealed by
Acts 1966, p. 424) provided that "every parent" having the custody and control of a minor
child shall be liable for injuries to persons caused by the child's willful acts of vandalism.
In Landers v. Medford, 108 Ga. App. 525, 133 S.E.2d 403 (1963), a Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a claim under this statute against a stepfather on the
ground that only one? parent could be held liable. The Court reasoned:
The caption or title of the 1956 Act ...which provides in part that "[Tlhe
parent having custody and control of a minor child * * * shall be liable * * *"
supports the interpretation that only one parent shall be liable for the acts of
vandalism.
The plaintiff's petition, while alleging that both the mother and stepfather
stand in loco parentis and have custody of Stanley, shows that Emma Medford was
the parent having custody and control of Stanley and consequently the general
demurrer of Ernest Medford was properly sustained....
108 Ga. App. at 528, 133 S.E.2d at 405-406. Three years later, however, as if to clarify its
original intention and possibly in direct response to the Medford decision, the Georgia
legislature amended its parental liability statute to include "[elvery parent or other person
in loco parentis." (Emphasis added). See GA. CODE ANN. § 105-113 (1968).
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is silent as to whether its provisions apply to a subrogated insurance
company, the general principles of subrogation 3 and the decisions
construing similar statutes in other jurisdictions indicate that they do.
For example, in General Insurance Co. of America v. Faulkne 36
the court considered whether an insurance company, as subrogee,
could maintain an action under North Carolina's parental liability
statute37 against the parents of a minor who had maliciously set
fire to the drapes in the school auditorium. In upholding the sub-
brogee insurance company's right to maintain an action under this
statute, the court noted that to allow the defendant to escape liability
merely because the property owner had insurance would give him
the benefit of insurance coverage for which he had not paid:
[I]t is not apparent why the prudent foresight of the . . .
[insured] . . . in protecting its property by insurance
should result in a detriment to the insurance company ....
The granting of subrogation will reach an equitable result;
to deny it would accomplish injustice.3
More recently, in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Hobart,9 the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Appellate District of Ohio, while re-
versing on other grounds a judgment in favor of a subrogee in-
surance company under Section 3109.09, nevertheless stated that it
did "approve of the doctrine of subrogation in this situation; pro-
vided, however, the subrogee stands in the shoes of the owner of the
property. '40
On the other hand, it could be argued that subrogation should
not be permitted because, as between the insurance company and the
parents of the minor wrongdoer, it is the insurance company which,
"I Ohio courts have always recognized the doctrine of subrogation:
The well-settled general rule is that if insured property is destroyed or damaged
through the fault or neglect of another than the insured, the insurer, upon pay-
ment of the loss, will be subrogated to the rights of the insured owner ... and that
the rights of the insurance company under such circumstances are precisely those
of the insured against the wrongdoer.
30 OHIO JUR. 2d Insurance § 887 at 813 (1958). (Emphasis added).
3259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963).
37 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-538.1 (1969). The statute provided:
Damages for malicious or wilful destruction of property by minors. Any person
... shall be entitled to recover damages in an amount not to exceed five hundred
dollars ($500.00) ... from the parents of any minor under the age of eighteen
(18) years, living with its parents, who shall maliciously or wilfully destroy
property ... belonging to any such person....
3259 N.C. at 326, 130 S.E.2d at 652.
39 No. 201 (July 31, 1972). The court reversed the lower court's judgment in favor of the
subrogee insurance company because the plaintiff's insured did not have legal title to the
damaged premises.
40 Id. at 3.
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in good conscience, ought to bear the loss. Since Section 3109.09 im-
poses liability upon the parents without regard to fault, the ultimate
issue involved is whether a paid surety (i.e., the insurance company
which contracted for the liability and has already received some com-
pensation in the form of premiums) or an unpaid surety (i.e., the
faultless parents who will not profit if the loss is assumed by the paid
surety) should bear the loss. Since the doctrine of subrogation is an
equitable one, it could be concluded that the insurance company, not
the parents, should pay.
While the author knows of no reported decisions reaching this
result under parental liability statutes, subrogation has been denied
in actions under an analogous statute which imposed vicarious lia-
bility on a municipality for damage to property resulting from a riot.41
Coverage Under a Homeowners Policy
With a large number 42 of Ohio families insured under howeown-
ers43 policies, a second question involving insurance that is likely to
arise in an action brought under Section 3109.09 is whether the par-
ents of the minor wrongdoer are entitled to coverage under that part
of the policy providing protection against personal liability. The
standard homeowners policy" provides that the insurance company
will
pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
41 See A. & B. Auto Stores of Jones Street, Inc. v. City of Newark, 59 N.J. 5, 279 A.2d 693
(1971). Note, however, that the court in A & B Auto Stores distinguished the General
Insurance decision on the grounds that there is a "concept of fault" in the parental liability
statute, and "that subrogaion would further the legislative intent." Id. at 26, 279 A.2d
at 704.
42 Although no exact figures are available, a "guesstimate" of the number of homeowners
policies in force in Ohio would be in excess of 1,000,000. This figure is derived by
dividing the total premiums collected in Ohio for all new and renewed homeowners polices
in 1971 ($125,478,524) as reported by the Ohio Department of Insurance by an estimated
average annual premium of $120.
4 The "homeowners" type policy was created by insurance companies when they began
combining, in one policy, insurance against loss to real and personal property with personal
liability insurance and other coverages requested by the average homeowner. At the
present time there are five "standard" homeowers forms or contracts described in the
trade as HO-1 (Basic Form); HO-2 (Broad Form); HO-3 (Special Form); HO-4 (Con-
tents Broad Form); and HO-5 (Comprehensive Form). These forms have been developed
by the Insurance Services Office (which is the consolidated successor of the Fire Insurance
Research and Actuarial Association, the Inland Marine Insurance Bureau, the Insurance
Rating Bureau, the Multi-Line Insurance Rating Bureau, the National Insurance Actuarial
and Statistical Association and the Insurance Data Processing Center, and is hereinafter
referred to as "ISO") and are widely used by insurance companies in Ohio, although a
few companies do use their own forms with variations in language and coverage. Com-
prehensive personal liability insurance may also be purchased separately, and the question
discussed in this section is relevant with respect to any type of insurance providing a
family with protection against personal liability.
44 See note 43 supra.
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bodily injury or property damage, to which this insurance
applies .... 45
But the policy goes on to exclude from such coverage "bodily injury
or property damage which is either expected or intended from the
standpoint of the insured. '46 Since a judgment under Section 3109.09
against a minor's parents would certainly be a claim which they are
"legally obligated to pay," the question of coverage must turn on the
applicability of the "intentional act" exclusion. 47
In 1955, the California Supreme Court considered such a ques-
tion in Arenson v. National Automobile & Cas. Ins. Co.4 In that
case the defendant insurance company had issued a "personal liability
policy" to the plaintiff which provided that the company would
pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become obligated to pay by reason of the liability im-
posed upon him by law .... 41
The policy also contained several exclusions, one of which provided
that the
4sISO Homeowners Policy, Section II, Coverage E- Personal Liability (September, 1970
Edition). At the present time all of the HO series homeowners polices contain the same
language with respect to the coverage provided for personal liability and with respect to the
exclusion from such coverage for intentional acts.
The insurance provided by this section should not be confused with the limited
coverage for property damage provided under the heading "Supplementary Coverages."
Under this heading the insurer agrees to either pay the actual cash value of property
damaged or destroyed by any insured, or repair or replace such property, without regard to
liability, but limits such liability to a maximum of $250. In addition, damage caused
intentionally by any insured who has attained the age 13 is excluded from coverage under
this section of the policy.
4 ISO Homeowners Policy, Section II, Exclusions, paragraph 1 (f) (September, 1970 Edition).
Prior to 1968 this section excluded liability for "bodily injury or property damage caused
intentionally by or at the direction of the insured."
4 For the purposes of this discussion it is assumed that the intentional act exclusion would
apply with respect to a claim made directly against the minor who is included as an insured
under a homeowners policy by virtue of the definition sections which provided:
When used in this policy the following definitions apply:
a. "Insured" means
(1) the Named Insured stated in the Declaration of this policy;
(2) if residents of the Named Insured's household, his spouse, the relatives of
either, and any other person under the age of twenty-one in the care
of the Insured:
But see note 65 infra.
445 Cal.2d 81, 286 P.2d 816 (1955). For a discussion of the Arenson case with respect
to an insurer's obligation to the parents of a minor wrongdoer under California's
general parental liability statute, see Note, Insurance: Liability of Insurer Under Personal
Liability Policy for Damage Caused by Willful Misconduct of Insured's Child - Application
of New California Statute, 7 HAST. L.J. 98 (1955).
49 Arenson v. National Automobile & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 P.2d 140, 142 & n.1 (Cal. App.
1954), rev'd, 45 Cal. 2d 81, 286 P.2d 816 (1955).
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policy does not apply (c) to injury, sickness, death or de-
struction caused intentionally by or at the direction of the
insured.50
The plaintiff was the named insured under the policy but the term
"insured" was defined to include, inter alia, his spouse and any other
person under the age of twenty-one in the care of the insured.51
Subsquent to the issuance of the policy, the plaintiff's minor son
intentionally damaged a school building owned by the Los Angeles
City School District. The School District then sued the plaintiff pur-
suant to Section 16074 of the California Education Code, 2 which
provided that the parent or guardian of a child who willfully dam-
aged school property would be liable for all damages sustained.
The defendant insurance company refused to defend the suit
or pay the amount of the judgment rendered against the plaintiff on
the grounds that the damage was caused intentionally by an insured
and thus excluded from coverage by the express language of its
policy. In reversing the lower court's decision and finding for the
plaintiff, the Supreme Court of California held that
the policy protects the named insured against liability for
intentional injury committed by another insured, and ac-
cordingly, it will be unnecessary to consider whether the
son's act was in fact intentional.5 3
The court's conclusion in Arenson reflects the established ra-
tionale that has been applied by the courts with respect to analogous
questions of coverage afforded partnerships and their individual part-
ners. For example, in Employers Surplus Lines of Boston, Mass. v.
W. L. Stone,4 the defendant insurance company had issued a public
liability policy to a partnership consisting of two partners engaged
in the business of operating horseback riding stables. The policy de-
0 276 P.2d at 142.
5145 Cal. 2d at 82, 286 P.2d at 816.
sStats 1943, C. 71, P. 631:
Any pupil who wilfully cuts, defaces or otherwise injures in any way any
property, real or personal, belonging to a school district is liable to suspension
or expulsion, and the parent or guardian shall be liable for all damages so
caused by the pupil.
Section 16074 of the California Code was repealed in 1959, but re-enacted as Section
10606 of the Education Code of 1959. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10606, as amended (West
Supp. 1974).
s3 45 Cal.2d at 83, 286 P.2d at 818. In analyzing the Arenson decision, the authors of Fire
Casualty and Surety Bulletins, Casualty & Surety Section, Public Liability at IAP-7 (5th
Printing, 1970) found that the Court's construction was consistent with their under-
standing of the coverage provided by homeowners policies. Moreover, the Arenson decision
has been followed by the courts of New Hampshire and Pennsylvania. See, Pawtucket
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lebrecht, 104 N.H. 465, 468, 190 A.2d 420, 423 (1963), Esmond
v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 211, 224 A.2d 793, 798 (1967).
s'388 P.2d 295 (Okla. 1964).
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fined "Insured" to include the named partnership as well as any part-
ner therein, but excluded coverage for any assault and battery "com-
mitted by or at the direction of the Insured." While the policy was in
force, one of the partners assaulted a customer of the partnership,
who brought suit against both partners for the injuries which he
suffered. The innocent partner settled the claim, and in turn brought
suit against the defendant insurance company to recover the amount
he had paid to settle the claim of the injured customer. In finding
that the defendant insurance company was obligated to indemnify
the innocent partner, the court noted that the defendant had insured
a partnership entity and by the terms of the policy has de-
fined the "unqualified" word "Insured" to include any part-
ner therein and as such they are "additional insureds," to
whom the insurer has assumed separate obligations. The
[innocent partner] does not fall within the exclusion terms
of the policy since he neither committed or directed the
assault.5
Although there are no reported decisions in Ohio considering an
insurance company's obligations with respect to claims asserted
against its insureds under Section 3109.09, the question was recently
decided by the Court of Common Pleas for Lake County in Nation-
wide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Blake. 6
In Nationwide, a 15-year-old boy had allegedly participated in
the vandalism of a high school owned by the Painesville, Ohio Board
of Education. The Board of Education's casualty insurance carriers
reimbursed it for the damage and then brought suit as subrogees in
the municipal court 57 against the parents of the minor under Section
3109.09.
At the time the vandalism occurred the minor's parents (as well
as the minor himself)O were insured under a homeowners policy
issued by Nationwide Insurance Company. Although Nationwide was
55 Id. at 298. The same result has been reached in many other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Malanga
v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 28 N.J. 220, 146 A.2d 105 (1958); Morgan v. Greater
New York Taxpayers Mut. Ins. Ass'n., 305 N.Y. 243, 112 N.E.2d 273 (1953).
Likewise, it appears that an insurance company which issues a public liability policy to
a corporation and defines "insured" to include not only the corporation but also its
officers and directors must indemnify the corporation for liability imposed upon it as the
result of an intentional act of one of its officers notwithstanding the fact that the policy
excludes coverage for intentional acts committed by "the Insured." See Portaro v.
American Guar. & Liability Ins. Co., 310 F.2d 897, 898 (6th Cir. 1962); Glens Falls
Indem. Co. v. Atlantic Bldg. Corp., 199 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1952).
s72-CIV-0221 (Sept. 12, 1973), affd. No. 5-037 (Eleventh App. Dist. May 28, 1974).
5 Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Blake, No. 37445 (Painesville Municipal Court, filed January
27, 1972).
s8 Nationwide's policy defined insured as "the named insured and members of his family,
including any other person under the age of twenty-one in the care of any of the fore-
going residing in the same household."
[Vol. 24:1
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss1/4
PARENTAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 8109.09
notified of the claims being asserted against its insureds, it refused
to undertake their defense and subsequently field a declaratory judg-
ment action with the Court of Common Pleas for Lake County59
for the purpose of establishing that it was under no legal obligation
to defend and/or pay any claims being asserted against the minor
and his parents arising from the minor's intentional acts.
The relevant language of Nationwide's policy was similar, al-
though not identical, to the language construed in the Arenson case.
While generally providing that it would pay on behalf of the insured
all sums which he would become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of bodily injury or injury to property, it excluded from cover-
age "bodily injury, illness, or death or property damage caused in-
tentionally by or at the direction of an insured ... "10
Nationwide argued, inter alia, that the Arenson and similar de-
cisions were not applicable to the present case because unlike the
policy construed in Arenson, the Nationwide policy excluded acts
caused intentionally by an insured, as opposed to merely the insured.6 1
Thus, by Nationwide's view, since an intentional act was committed
by the parents' son, an insured under the policy, coverage was for-
feited for all insureds, including the parents.
62
59 No. 72-CIV-0221 (Sept. 12, 1973).
60 Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company Basic Homeowners Policy, Section II, part
II, paragraph 1 (a) (July, 1971 Edition) (emphasis added).
Nationwide's policy also provided in the preface to Section II that the "[plolicy
insures those named in the Declarations against loss from damages for negligent personal
acts ... arising out of the ownership, mainenance or use of real or personal property...."
On the basis of this language Judge Robert E. Cook of the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Appellate District would have reversed the decision of the Court of Common
Pleas. In his dissenting opinion Judge Cook stated:
The real question is whether Richard and Pamela Blake are covered under the
terms of the policy for liability for the intentional acts of their son, a fellow
insured.
I believe the answer is found in the preface to Section II of the policy:
"PROTECTION AGAINST LIABILITY.
" Part [sic] II of this Homeowner's [sic] Policy insures those named
in the declarations against loss from damages for negligent personal
acts...."
An intentional act by a party is not an act of negligence....
Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the Homeowners policy which is the
subject of this action only protects each of the insureds from liability for his
own negligent acts or the negligent acts of others for which he is liable.
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Blake, No. 5-037 (Eleventh App. Dist. May 28, 1974)
at 3, 4, (Dissenting opinion of Judge Cook). It should be noted that the "standard" home-
owners policies do not contain such language.
61 See text accompanying note 50 supra.
62 Brief for Plaintiff at 3. See also letter from Louis Euphrat, claims attorney, Nationwide
Mutual Fire Insurance Company, to Howard W. Bernstein (the attorney representing
Nationwide's insureds), dated December 22, 1971, in which Mr. Euphrat explains:
There is an important distinction in the language of this coverage in that,
although many years ago, the policy language referred to damage or injury "by
or at the direction of the insured...." this language was purposely changed to
(Continued on next page)
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However, the court did not accept Nationwide's argument, and
found that Nationwide was obligated to defend and/or pay the
claim asserted against the parents. In so holding, the court found
that the parents' actions were not intentional, and noted that while
the child was excluded from coverage by the terms of the policy,
his parents were not:
The Court is of the opinion that the Policy creates a several
obligation to each of the named insureds and those included
by reason of relationship. The Court is further of the opinion
that there exists a duty on the plaintiff [Nationwide] to
defend their named insureds and in the event of a recovery,
to pay any claims to the extent and limit of the statute and
their [sic] policy.6 3
In light of the Arenson and Nationwide decisions, and in light
of the well established rule of construction that exceptions and ex-
clusions in an insurance policy must be construed strictly against
the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured,64 it appears that the
intentional act exclusion65 presently found in the homeowners policy
will not relieve an insurance company of its obligation to defend
and/or pay claims asserted under Section 3109.09 against its insured
parents.
(Continued from preceding page)
exclude the intentional act of an insured, meaning any additional insured who
is entitled to coverage under the policy of the named insured. This change arose
from case law that intentional acts caused by insured persons other than the
named insured did not exclude coverage because the named insured did not
commit the intentional act.
63 Opinion of Judge John F. Clair, Jr., at 3.
"See 30 OHIO JUR. 2d Insurance § 215 (1958). In affirming the Common Pleas Court's
decision, the Court of Appeals held:
While admitting that a tenable argument can be made to support either position
taken as to coverage under the insurance policy in question, we prefer to hold
as the Trial Judge did for the singular reason that it is not dear whether or not
Nationwide intended that its policy cover Richard and Pamela Blake for the
damages done by the willful acts of their son, David. It is because of this
ambiguity that the language must be construed most favorably to Richard and
Pamela as opposed to Nationwide, the scrivener of the Homeowner's Policy....
We limit coverage to the facts herein presented and suggest that, in any event,
Nationwide consider redrafting its Homeowner's policy to be sold to Ohio
customers to make it "perfectly dear" what the intentions for coverage are to
be regarding similar factual situations that will no doubt arise from time to
time in Ohio.
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Blake, No. 5-037 (May 28, 1974) at 1, 2.
65While the "intentional act" exclusion may not relieve an insurance company of the
obligation to defend claims asserted against its insured parents under Section 3109.09
for acts committed by their child, the facts necessary to establish such a claim would
appear to relieve the insurance company of any liability for claims asserted directly against
the minor child who is also an insured under the typical homeowners policy. See note
47 supra. As previously indicated in note 9 supra, to impose liability on the parents under
(Continued on next page)
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Conclusion*
Although Section 3109.09 has been the subject of only one re-
ported decision there are nevertheless significant issues as to whether
the statute imposes liability for the theft as well as the destruction
of property; who may be considered a parent and thus be held liable
under the statute; whether an insurance company may maintain
an action under the statute as subrogee of the injured party; and
whether an insurer under a "homeowners" policy must defend and in-
demnify its insured parents who are sued under the statute for
damage caused by the willful acts of their child. There are persuasive
arguments on both sides of these issues and notwithstanding the
unreported decisions cited in this article, these arguments should not
be overlooked in prosecuting or defending an action under Section
3109.09.
(Continued from preceding page)
Section 3109.09 one must show that their child "willfully" (i.e., that he acted with
purpose and design and intended the result of his act) damaged property, and the exclu-
sionary language of the homeowners policy leaves little doubt that if such facts are
established the child would forfeit his right to coverage. On the other hand, if the facts
show that the child acted intentionally, although not willfully (e.g., where a child intends
to set a fire, but does not intend the resulting damages), liability could not be imposed on
the parents under Section 3109.09. But there is considerable authority that under such
circumstances an insurance company would be required to defend and/or pay the claims
asserted against the child directly because the exclusion is applicable only if it can be
shown that an insured had the "specific intent to damage property." See, e.g., Sykes v.
Midwestern Indem. Co., 34 Ohio Misc. 73 (C.P. 1973); Connecticut Indem. Co. v.
Nestor, 4 Mich. App. 578, 145 N.W.2d 399 (1966); Annot., 2 A.L.R. 3d 1238 (1965).
If at the time of filing suit there is not sufficient evidence available to determine accurately
a child's state of mind at the time he damaged property, it is recommended that the
Complaint contain alternative counts setting forth both (1) a claim against the parents
under Section 3109.09 on the ground that the child acted willfully and intended the
results of his acts and (2) a claim against the child on the grounds that, although the
child committed an intentional act, he did not intend the damage which resulted.
* ADDENDUM:
As this article goes to press, Sen. Gene Slagle (D-26) has introduced S.B. No. 37 in the
llth General Assembly which seeks to amend Section 3109.09 by adding "guardians"
as those persons who are subject to the statute's provisions.
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